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Abstract
In this paper, a bilevel programming model is proposed to study a problem of market
regulation through government intervention. One of the main characteristics of the problem
herein analyzed is that the government monopolizes the raw material in one industry, and
competes in another industry with private firms for the production of commodities. Under
this scheme, the government controls a state-owned firm to balance the market; that is, to
minimize the difference between the produced and demanded commodities. On the other
hand, a regulatory organism that coordinates private firms aims to maximize the total profit
by deciding the amount of raw material bought from the state-owned firm. Two equivalent
single-level reformulations are proposed to solve the problem. The first reformulation is
based on the strong duality condition of the lower level and results in a continuous non-
linear model. The second reformulation resorts to the complementarity slackness optimality
constraints yielding a mixed-integer linear model. Additionally, three heuristic algorithms
are designed to obtain good-quality solutions with low computational effort. In this problem,
the feasible region of the dual problem associated to the follower is independent from the
leader’s decision. Therefore, the proposed heuristics exploit this particular characteristic
of the bilevel model. Moreover, the third heuristic hybridizes the other two algorithms to
enhance its performance. Extensive computational experimentation is carried out to measure
the efficiency of the proposed solution methodologies. A case study based on the Mexican
petrochemical industry is presented. Additional instances generated from the case study
are considered to validate the robustness of the proposed heuristic algorithms. Numerical
results indicate that the hybrid algorithm outperforms the other two heuristics. However, all
of them demonstrate to be good alternatives for solving the problem. Additionally, optimal
solutions of all the instances are obtained by using good quality solutions (given by the
hybrid algorithm) as initial solutions when solving the second reformulation via a general
purpose solver.
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1. Introduction1
Market regulation through government intervention has appeared in different ways, such2
as, fiscal policies (taxes and subsidies), anti-monopoly legislation, price control, quantity3
control, and nationalization of firms [1]. Two of the main motivations for regulating the4
economy is to seek social equity and to handle market failures [2]. A specific manner of5
government intervention is through the participation of state-owned firms, which are under6
the government control and compete with the private firms. The goal to regulate the market7
by participation has been very noticeable in developing countries, mainly in raw materials8
industries [3]. For instance, a list of countries in which market regulation by participation9
exists in oil industry is presented in [4], [5], [6]. At this point we would like to emphasize10
that this situation occurred in Mexico in the petrochemical industry from 1958 until 2014.11
12
The first paper that considers the idea of regulate the market by including a state-owned13
firm is [7]. In that paper, a short-term analysis that concerns with the entrance of a state-14
owned firm into a three-firms oligopoly market is done. They conclude that the existence of15
a state-owned firm may improve the performance of the market, which it is also shown in [8]16
in the aerospace market. Following up with the existence of state-owned firms, [9] considers17
a situation in which the difference between the production and the production level is made18
up by the government. The novelty in that paper is to realize that state-owned firm acts19
as the dominant decision-maker, that is, it has complete information of the market and20
announces its decision. Hence, each private firm reacts to this decision by establishing its21
output level so that its marginal cost equals the price. Furthermore, [10] explicitly considers22
the state-owned firm as a leader in a Stackelberg game. Later, in [11], a mixed oligopoly23
model that helps to compare the differences among the nationalization of a state-owned firm24
and the entrance of a new state-owned firm is studied. This last paper also analyzes the cost25
effectiveness of the state-owned firms in the long-term and moreover, the authors consider26
for the first time a budgetary constraint associated with the state-owned firm to guarantee27
a minimum profit.28
29
Literature reviews regarding mixed oligopolies can be found in [12] and [13]. In those30
reviews the common characteristics of these models are identified. Particularly, the context31
of the problem, the cases when the government provides complete information, the goal of32
the state-owned firm, the technology assumptions, the costs structure, and the hierarchy33
among the firms (in case of Stackelberg games). Another literature review that deals with34
some foundations for a theory of mixed oligopoly markets is presented in [14]. It is important35
to remark that all the above mentioned papers coincide in that there is a lack of an unified36
and accepted general mixed oligopolies modeling framework because each model pursues its37
own characteristics and set different basic hypothesis. At this point, it is also important to38
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emphasize that, to the best of our knowledge and after an intensive literature review, the39
intervention of the government via state-owned firms to regulate an industry conformed by40
two interrelated markets has not been studied before. However, these characteristics appear41
in real situations, as it will be described in the case study herein considered.42
43
The problem studied in this paper is inspired by a situation where a state-owned firm44
controls the monopoly of a market but this is interrelated with a second market in which45
state-owned and private firms compete. The problem considers two interdependent indus-46
tries, in which the first one produces the necessary supplies for the second one. The gov-47
ernment has the monopoly of the first industry, while in the second industry a state-owned48
firm competes with remaining private firms in the production of commodities. Private firms49
aim to maximize their profit. Government aims as a general social welfare to balance the50
market. The latter is achieved by minimizing the difference between the supply and demand51
of the final commodities.52
53
Given the privileged position that the government occupies in this market as the leader54
decision-maker, the government decides the amount of commodities that will be produced at55
the state-owned firms and the amount of supplies that will be offered to the private firms. By56
doing this, the government will regulate indirectly the production. One can easily appreciate57
a hierarchical relationship between both economic agents, in which the government makes a58
decision and the private firms reacts to it affecting the balance in the market. Furthermore,59
technical and technological issues in the raw material market limit the production, for ex-60
ample, the scarcity of natural resources and the existing production capacity of the firms.61
The hierarchy and inter-relationship among the actors of this situation allow to formulate a62
bilevel programming model, in which the government will act as the leader and the private63
firms as the follower. Other bilevel models in which the government intervenes to regulate64
social aspects are [15] and [16]. In the former, the government employs an intervention pol-65
icy based on subsidies in the automotive market, while in the latter, the government apply66
taxes via an agro-environmental policy imposed to the agriculturists. Additionally, the gen-67
eral model proposed by us perfectly fits to the petrochemical industry in several developing68
countries in the last decades and it was the case of Mexico for almost 56 years, where it was69
apparently run without a theoretically recognizable model.70
71
The main contributions of this paper can be listed as follows: a novel mathematical72
bilevel programming model to study a mixed-oligopoly market, three heuristic algorithms73
based on an iterative exploration of vertices in the inducible region of the bilevel problem, an74
extensive computational study analyzing the performance of our exact reformulations and75
the proposed heuristic algorithms, and a case-study based on the Mexican petrochemical76
industry.77
78
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the mathematical79
programming bilevel model and sets the notation. Two reformulations of the bilevel model80
that reduce it to a single-level one are presented in section 3. The first one is a continuous81
3
non-linear problem, and the second one reduces to a mixed integer linear program. In82
both cases, the resulting programs are hard to solve for medium to large sizes. Then,83
section 4 describes three proposed heuristic algorithms to provide good quality solutions84
for the bilevel model. Section 5 reports the numerical results according to the case study85
under consideration, and compares the results obtained through the reformulations and86
the algorithms. Also, the results obtained from additional experimentation with random87
instances are summarized. Conclusions and recommendations for future research are given88
in section 6.89
2. A market regulation bilevel problem90
2.1. Problem’s description91
The problem herein studied considers an industry conformed by two economic markets,92
one of them associated to raw material and the other one of the final commodities. The93
supplies (raw material) of the second economic market are produced in the first one. In94
this industry, there is a state-owned firm vertically integrated, that is, that produces in95
both economic markets. The state-owned firm monopolizes the production of the supplies96
in the first economic market, but in the other one, this firm competes against the private97
firms. All the firms have a maximum production capacity and the state-owned firm requires98
to obtain a minimum profit (there is a lower bound over its net profit). The objective of99
this latter firm is to balance the market by its intervention. To achieve this goal, it mini-100
mizes the lack and surplus of the offered commodities with respect to the demand. Hence,101
this firm determines its production of commodities and the amount of supplies to be offered102
to the private firms. On the other hand, private firms’ goal will be to maximize their benefit.103
104
The decisions taken by the state-owned firm limit the admissible production by the pri-105
vate firms, and the decisions of the private firms affect the achievement of the government.106
As it is mentioned before, the government has the monopoly of the supplies production, and107
it is assumed that there exists a centralized organism that regulates the supplies demand.108
This organism determines the amount of supplies to each private firm, which is common109
in economic markets with government intervention. A typical example occurs when the110
government creates organisms to regulate the competition among firms and establishes par-111
ticular contracts with each private firm fixing the supplies to be sold to each one. Another112
case is when the private firms get together and create a centralized mechanism to which113
the responsibility of distributing supplies among them is delegated. In the latter case, that114
mechanism seeks for a global welfare of the market; this is the case of common lands coop-115
erative organization in agriculture. Under this scheme, the government will be the leader116
and the centralized mechanism the follower.117
2.2. Mathematical formulation118
In this section, the mathematical formulation of the problem described in the previous119
section is formally introduced. Let I be the set of commodities and let J be the set of120
private firms. Each commodity i ∈ I is sold at a price pi, and it has a demand di in the121
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market. To produce a commodity i ∈ I, it costs cGi to the state-owned firm and cEij to a122
private firm j ∈ J . The government fixes a minimum profit t to be obtained by the state-123
owned firm. The amount of primary resources that a private firm j ∈ J needs to produce124
a unit of commodity i ∈ I is denoted by bij and the amount of supply required to produce125
a unit of commodity i ∈ I is denoted by aij. Both types of firms have a limited production126
capacity. The state-owned firm has a maximum production capacity qBi to obtain supplies127
of the commodity i ∈ I and a maximum amount qAi to produce for each commodity i ∈ I.128
Also, each private firm j ∈ J has a maximum production capacity mj.129
130
In order to present our mathematical programming formulation, we will use the following131
decision variables. The leader’s decision variables are:132
xi, which denotes the production of the state-owned firm for each commodity i ∈ I.133
zi, which denotes the supply offered by the government to the private firms to produce a134
commodity in ∈ I.135
136
The follower’s decision variables are:137
yij, which denotes the amount produced by private firm j ∈ J of a commodity i ∈ I.138
139
In our model, non-negative auxiliary variables are introduced to express the leader’s ob-140
jective function. Let ri be the shortage of commodity i ∈ I and let si be the corresponding141
surplus.142
143
With the above elements, the proposed bilevel programming formulation to model the144
regulation of the economic market described above results as follows:145
min
x,z,r,s,y
∑
i∈I
(ri + si) (1)
s.t.
∑
j∈J yij + xi
di
+ ri − si = 1 ∀i ∈ I (2)∑
i∈I
(pi − cGi )xi ≥ t (3)
0 ≤ xi ≤ qAi ∀i ∈ I (4)
0 ≤ zi ≤ qBi ∀i ∈ I (5)
ri ≥ 0 ∀ ∈ Ii (6)
si ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (7)
y ∈ argmax
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
(pi − cEij)y¯ij (8)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
aij y¯ij ≤ zi ∀i ∈ I (9)∑
i∈I
bij y¯ij ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (10)
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y¯ij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J (11)
The leader’s problem is defined by (1)-(8), in which (1) represents the leader’s objective146
function that aims to minimize the inefficiency of the market, namely the overall shortage147
and surplus production with respect to the total demand. Constraint (2) seeks to balance the148
demand of each commodity with the corresponding production of the state-owned and pri-149
vate firms. In (3), it is ensured that the state-owned firm obtains a minimum required profit150
from its commodities production. Constraints (4) and (5) establish the production capacity151
associated with the commodities and offered supplies, respectively. The non-negativity of152
the auxiliary variables is expressed in (6) and (7). Constraint (8) plays a key role in this153
model, due to the fact that it requires that the value of the follower’s variables is given by the154
optimal solution of another mathematical programming problem. The follower’s problem155
is defined by equations (8)-(11), which aims to maximize the total profit of all the private156
firms. The production of the private firms is limited by the amount of supplies provided by157
the government, this is enforced by (9). Constraint (10) imposes that each private firm’s158
production cannot exceed its maximum capacity. Finally, (11) expresses the non-negativity159
of the follower’s variables.160
161
In order to have a well-defined formulation for the proposed bilevel model, it is neces-162
sary to make an assumption regarding multiple optimal solutions that may appear in the163
follower’s problem. We assume the optimistic approach defined in [17]. In other words,164
among all the optimal follower’s solutions, the one that minimizes the leader’s objective165
function is selected. The optimistic approach is suitable for the situation under study since166
it may express the existence of a certain cooperation degree among the government and the167
mechanism (committee) that represents the private firms.168
3. Exact solution methodologies169
A common methodology that applies, at times, to solve a bilevel programming model is170
to transform it to a single-level reformulation. In order to achieve this goal, the character-171
istics of the follower’s problem have to be exploited. Once a leader’s solution is established,172
the leader’s variables are fixed in the follower’s problem. Particularly, z is going to be con-173
sidered as a parameter in the problem defined by (8)-(11). Therefore, the follower’s problem174
results in a linear programming problem that has a corresponding dual, in which α and β175
correspond to the associated dual variables. The dual problem associated with the follower’s176
problem is as follows:177
178
min
α,β
∑
i∈I
αizi +
∑
j∈J
βjmj (12)
s.t. aijαi + bijβj ≥ (pi − cEij) ∀i, ∀j (13)
αi ≥ 0 ∀i (14)
βj ≥ 0 ∀j (15)
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For both, the primal and dual of the follower’s problem, the space of feasible solutions179
is bounded. Hence, the fundamental duality theorem states that both problems have op-180
timal solutions and their objective function values are equal [18]. Hence, two single-level181
reformulations that are equal to the bilevel model are presented in this section. The first182
reformulation ensures that the optimal solution of the reformulated model are in the in-183
ducible region of the bilevel problem by using a corollary of the strong duality theorem.184
The second reformulation substitutes a non-linear constraint of the first reformulation via185
the complementarity slackness constraint. The first reformulation results in a continuous186
non-linear model and the second one is a mixed-integer linear model.187
3.1. Non-linear reformulation based on the strong duality condition188
The first reformulation consists in adding the constraints associated with the dual of
the follower’s problem, that is, (12-15), and to use the necessary and sufficient optimality
conditions to ensure that the follower’s decision belongs to the set of rational reactions.
Therefore, a constraint that equals the follower’s primal and dual objective functions is
added. For a predefined leader’s fixed value of z the resulting constraint is as follows:∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
(pi − cEij)yij =
∑
i∈I
αizi +
∑
j∈J
βjmj (16)
The first proposed reformulation consists in the following non-linear single-level problem:
min
x,z,r,s,y,α,β
∑
i∈I
(ri + si) (Ref.1)
s.t.
∑
j∈J yij + xi
di
+ ri − si = 1 ∀i ∈ I (17)∑
i∈I
(pi − cGi )xi ≥ t (18)
0 ≤ xi ≤ qAi ∀i ∈ I (19)
0 ≤ zi ≤ qBi ∀i ∈ I (20)
ri ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (21)
si ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (22)∑
j∈J
aijyij ≤ zi ∀i ∈ I (23)∑
i∈I
bijyij ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (24)
yij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (25)
aijαi + bijβj ≥ (pi − cEij) ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (26)
αi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (27)
βj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J (28)
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∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
(pi − cEij)yij =
∑
i∈I
αizi +
∑
j∈J
βjmj (29)
Note that the linearity of the model is lost in (29). Further, it can be represented in the189
following manner since weak duality implies that the other inequality is always satisfied.190
−
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
(pi − cEij)yij +
∑
i∈I
αizi +
∑
j∈J
βjmj ≤ 0 (30)
3.2. Mixed-integer linear reformulation based on complementarity slackness191
The second reformulation is based on the complementarity slackness constraints that192
ensures the optimality of the follower’s problem. A single-level reformulation is recovered193
by introducing the following constraints:194
αi
(
zi −
∑
j∈J
aijyij
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ I (31)
βj
(
mj −
∑
i∈I
bijyij
)
= 0 ∀j ∈ J (32)
yij
(
aijαi + bijβj − (pi − cEij)
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (33)
Constraints (31), (32), and (33) are non-linear, nevertheless they can be linearized in a195
straightforward manner by introducing positive big-M constants M1i , M
2
i , and M
3
i for all196
i ∈ I. Also, binary variables γi, δj, and ij for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J are included. Constraints197
(31)-(33) are replaced by the following constraints:198
αi ≤ M1i γi ∀i ∈ I (34)
zi −
∑
j∈J
aijyij ≤ M1i (1− γi) ∀i ∈ I (35)
βj ≤ M2i δj ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (36)
mj −
∑
i∈I
bijyij ≤ M2i (1− δj) ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (37)
yij ≤ M3i ij ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J (38)
aijαi + bijβj − (pi − cEij) ≤ M3i (1− ij) ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (39)
Therefore, this reformulation results in the following single-level linear mixed-integer
programming model.
min
x,z,r,s,y,α,β,γ,δ,
∑
i∈I
(ri + si) (Ref.2)
s.t.
∑
j∈J yij + xi
di
+ ri − si = 1 ∀i ∈ I (40)
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∑
i∈I
(pi − cGi )xi ≥ t (41)
0 ≤ xi ≤ qAi ∀i ∈ I (42)
0 ≤ zi ≤ qBi ∀i ∈ I (43)
ri ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (44)
si ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (45)∑
j∈J
aijyij ≤ zi ∀i ∈ I (46)∑
i∈I
bijyij ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (47)
yij ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ J (48)
aijαi + bijβj ≥ (pi − cEij) ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (49)
αi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (50)
βj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J (51)
αi ≤M1i γi ∀i ∈ I (52)
zi −
∑
j∈J
aijyij ≤M2i (1− γi) ∀i ∈ I (53)
βj ≤M1j δj ∀j ∈ J (54)
mj −
∑
i∈I
bijyij ≤M2j (1− δj) ∀j ∈ J (55)
yij ≤M1ijij ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (56)
aijαi + bijβj − (pi − cEij) ≤M2ij(1− ij) ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (57)
γi, δj, ij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (58)
3.3. Adjusting the value of the big M ’s199
In the problem under study, parameters a and b are always positives, which means that if200
more commodity production exists, more supplies are required and more production capacity201
is used in the private firms. Moreover, if term pi − cEij is negative, private firms are having202
losses, which would lead to their exit from the economic market.203
Definition. Define the upper bound UB(·) ∈ R of a vector as a real number that is is204
greater than or equal to all of the components of that vector.205
To adjust the value of M1i for all i ∈ I, first we seek for an upper bound for αi, such that206
α belongs to an optimal solution of the follower’s dual problem. The worst scenario occurs207
when βj = 0 ∀j ∈ J , then αi ≥ pi−c
E
ij
aij
for all i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J must hold due to (49). Since (12)208
aims to minimize, the optimal solution occurs at equality. To obtain the upper bound for209
M2i for all i ∈ I, constraint (53) is considered. Hence, it is possible to state the following210
proposition.211
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Proposition 1.212
1. The upper bound for any optimal value of αi for all i ∈ I is as follows:213
214
UB(αi) = maxj∈J{pi−c
E
ij
aij
}215
2. The upper bound for constraint (53) is as follows:216
217
UB
(
zi −
∑
j∈J aijyij
)
= qBi .218
Analogously that for Mki , the upper bounds for M
k
j i = 1, 2 and k = 1, 2 are computed.219
Proposition 2.220
1. The upper bound for any optimal value of βj for all j ∈ J is:221
UB(βj) = maxi∈I{pi−c
E
ij
bij
}.222
2. The upper bound for constraint (55) is:223
UB
(
mj −
∑
i∈I bijyij
)
= mj.224
To bound the values of Mkij for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J and k = 1, 2, the following proposition is225
stated.226
Proposition 3.227
1. The upper bounds for yij for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J are:228
229
UB(yij) =
mj
bij
,230
i.e. yij ≤ mjbij for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J .231
2. The upper bound of constraint (57) is:232
233
UB(aijαi + bijβj − (pi − cEij)) = aijUB(αi) + bijUB(βj).234
Therefore, the adjusted values for Mki , M
k
j , and M
k
ij for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J , k = 1, 2 based235
on the computed upper bounds are as follows:236
M1i = max
j∈J
{pi − c
E
ij
aij
}, ∀i ∈ I (59)
M2i = q
B
i , ∀i ∈ I (60)
M1j = max
i∈I
{pi − c
E
ij
bij
}, ∀j ∈ J (61)
M2j = mj, ∀j ∈ J (62)
M1ij =
mj
bij
, ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (63)
M2ij = aijUB(αi) + bijUB(βj), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J. (64)
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4. Heuristic solution methodologies237
Usually, the reformulations introduced above present computational limitations for large-238
size instances. Therefore, alternative approaches are required to solve the bilevel problem.239
One common approach is to design a heuristic algorithm to obtain good quality feasible240
solutions with lower computational burden. In this section, three tailor-made heuristic al-241
gorithms are proposed to solve the problem under study. The first two heuristics exploit the242
particular structure of the bilevel problem, while the third one hybridizes the other two. The243
hybrid heuristic contains key aspects from the previously proposed heuristics to enhance its244
performance.245
246
Note that it has been already emphasized that the polyhedron that defines the feasible247
region of the dual problem associated with the follower is independent from the leader’s248
variables. Therefore, if all the vertices of this polyhedron were known, equality (16) and249
the dual constraints of the first reformulation described in section 3.1 could be substituted250
by a set of constraints guaranteeing that the equality (16) would be achieved in one vertex.251
Following the latter idea, the dual variables are replaced by parameters that represents those252
known vertices. This is the approach exploited in the three proposed heuristic algorithms.253
254
4.1. Extreme points iterated algorithm (EPIA)255
In this algorithm, vertices of the dual polyhedron are iteratively generated, and a mixed-256
integer programming problem named the Master Problem (MP) is solved for each new257
vertex. The optimal solution of the MP ensures a feasible solution of the bilevel problem.258
The algorithm stops when no improvement in the leader’s objective function is obtained.259
260
Let P be the polyhedron associated with the dual constraints of problem (13)-(15). Con-261
sider vk = (α
k, βk) ∈ P, k = 1, ..., |P | as the vertices of P , in which |P | define the number262
of vertices in that polyhedron with αk = (αk1, ..., α
k
|I|) and β
k = (βk1 , ..., α
k
|J |). Let F be263
the leader’s objective function (1). Also, let f and g be the follower primal (8) and dual264
(12) objective functions, respectively. Consider χ = (x, z, r, s) as a vector that groups the265
leader’s variables and Υ = (y1, ..., y|J |) as a vector that groups the follower’s variables. De-266
fine ϕ as the set of vertices in P that has been already explored. At each iteration K = |ϕ|267
is updated using k ∈ K as the index of the explored vertices. UB(zi) represents an upper268
bound of variable zi, which can be naturally fixed as q
B
i . Hence, the MP is defined as follows:269
270
min
x,z,r,s,y,λ
∑
i∈I
(ri + si) (65)
s.t.
∑
j∈J yij + xi
di
+ ri − si = 1 ∀i ∈ I (66)∑
i∈I
(pi − cGi )xi ≥ t (67)
0 ≤ xi ≤ qAi ∀i ∈ I (68)
0 ≤ zi ≤ qBi ∀i ∈ I (69)
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ri ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (70)
si ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (71)∑
j∈J
aijyij ≤ zi ∀i ∈ I (72)∑
i∈I
bijyij ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (73)
yij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (74)∑
i∈I
αki zi +
∑
j∈J
βkjmj − (1− λk)(
∑
i∈I
αki UB(zi) +
∑
j∈J
βkjmj) ≤
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
(pi − cEij)yij ∀k ∈ K (75)∑
k∈K
λk = 1 (76)
λk ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ K (77)
271
Constraints (75)-(77) guarantee that f(Υ) = g(χ, vk) holds only for a single vertex, in272
which λ is an auxiliary binary variable. The obtained solution Υ∗ belongs to the rational273
reaction set. Hence, the optimal solution of MP is a feasible solution of the bilevel problem.274
275
The process in which the dual problem (12)-(15) is solved for a fixed vector z obtaining276
an optimal solution v = (α, β) is represented as D(z)→ v. Analogously, solve MP for a set277
of vertices ϕ is denoted as MP(ϕ) → (χ,Υ). The result is a pair of solutions (χ,Υ). The278
pseudocode of the EPIA is presented in algorithm 4.1.279
280
Algorithm 4.1 Extreme points iterated algorithm
Step 1. Initialization: ϕ = ∅, ρ =∞;
Step 2. Find the initial vertices D(0)→ v1. D(qBi )→ v2. ϕ = ϕ ∪ {v1, v2};
Step 3. Solve the master problem: MP(ϕ)→ (χk,Υk). pi = F (χk,Υk);
Step 4. Find a vertex k: D(zk)→ vk;
Step 5. Evaluate leader’s objective function.
• If ρ > pi then ϕ = ϕ ∪ {vk}, ρ = pi. Return to Step 3;
• If ρ ≤ pi then stops.
Output: pi, (χk, Υk)
Note that optimality of the bilevel problem is not guaranteed by this algorithm. The281
main reason is that during the process, the algorithm may not improve the leader’s objective282
function. This may occurs when the value zk obtained at iteration k produces a vertex vk283
that is already in set ϕ, or simply when F (χk,Υk) ≥ F (χk−1,Υk−1).284
4.2. Follower’s gap penalization algorithm (FGPA)285
The general idea of FGPA is to find a feasible solution by using vertices of the follower’s286
dual problem, but the dual admits infeasible solutions. The algorithm consists on itera-287
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tively solving a mixed-integer programming problem, named MMP, that is a modification288
of the MP described in previous section. The MMP permits the existence of a gap be-289
tween follower’s primal objective function and the dual objective function value obtained by290
evaluating the considered vertices. However, this gap is penalized in the leader’s objective291
function aiming to obtain a good feasible solution.292
293
Since the primal and dual objective values of the follower can be different, the algorithm
may explore other dual vertices using solutions that are in the constraint region of the bilevel
problem, but not necessarily in the inducible region. Hence, to ensure feasibility, at the end
of the iterations another problem named Resulting problem (RP) must be solved. RP is a
linear single-level problem defined by constraints (1)-(7) of the leader, constraints (9)-(11) of
the follower, and a constraint that equals f(Υ) with the value of the dual objective function
g evaluated with the last obtained value of z (zˆ = zk). Therefore, ψ = g(zk) is a parameter
used in: ∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
(pi − cEij)yij = ψ (78)
In MMP, the gap is normalized by a constant M and multiplied by a coefficient µ to294
regulate the impact in the leader’s objective function, that is, to balance the supply and295
demand. The value of M can be bounded by the maximum among all the optimal values of296
the dual problem obtained at each iteration. The modified master problem (MMP) is follows:297
298
min
x,z,r,s,y,λ,ε
∑
i∈I
(ri + si) +
ε
M
µ (79)
s.t.
∑
j∈J yij + xi
di
+ ri − si = 1 ∀i ∈ I (80)∑
i∈I
(pi − cGi )xi ≥ t (81)
0 ≤ xi ≤ qAi ∀i ∈ I (82)
0 ≤ zi ≤ qBi ∀i ∈ I (83)
ri ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (84)
si ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (85)∑
j∈J
aijyij ≤ zi ∀i ∈ I (86)∑
i∈I
bijyij ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (87)
yij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (88)∑
k∈K
λk = 1 (89)
λk ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ K (90)
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εk +
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
(pi − cEij)yij =
∑
i∈I
αki zi +
∑
j∈J
βkjmj ∀k ∈ K (91)
εk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K (92)
ε ≥ 0 (93)
ε ≥ εk − (1− λk)M ∀k ∈ K (94)
Therefore, the RP that is used to obtain a solution in the inducible region is:299
300
min
x,r,s,y
∑
i∈I
(ri + si) (95)
s.t.
∑
j∈J yij + xi
di
+ ri − si = 1 ∀i ∈ I (96)∑
i∈I
(pi − cGi )xi ≥ t (97)
0 ≤ xi ≤ qAi ∀i ∈ I (98)
ri ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (99)
si ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (100)∑
j∈J
aijyij ≤ zˆi ∀i ∈ I (101)∑
i∈I
bijyij ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (102)
yij ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ J (103)∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
(pi − cEij)yij = ψ (104)
To refer to the MMP, define MMP(ϕ,M) → (χ,Υ) as in the previous algorithm. The301
leader’s objective function (79) is represented by F ∗. Also, RP(ϕ, ψ, zˆ) → (χ,Υ) denotes302
the process of solving RP using the set of vectors ϕ and the parameters ψ and zˆ. The303
pseudocode of FGPA is shonw in algorithm 4.2.304
305
4.3. Hybrid algorithm (HYBA)306
As mentioned before, the EPIA cannot ensure to obtain a new vertex in each itera-307
tion nor a vertex that improves the leader’s objective function. An intuitive idea is to use308
the FGPA to avoid this issue. The latter algorithm has de advantage of exploring solutions309
that does not belong to the inducible region, by doing this, unexplored vertices are obtained.310
311
The main idea of the HYBA is to perform the steps of EPIA until stops. When this312
occurs, a subroutine that solves the MMP is performed to find a new vertex aiming to reach313
a different feasible solution. If the new exploration improves the leader’s objective function,314
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Algorithm 4.2 Follower’s gap penalization algorithm
Step 1. Initialization: ϕ = ∅, ρ =∞, M = Max{1, D(qBi )};
Step 2. Solve the modified master problem: PMM(ϕ,M)→ (χk,Υk). pi = F ∗(χk,Υk);
Step 3. Find a vertex k: D(zk)→ vk. M = Max{M, D(zk)};
Step 4. Evaluate leader’s objective funcion.
• If ρ > pi then ϕ = ϕ ∪ {vk}, ρ = pi. Return to Step 2;
• If ρ ≤ pi then go to Step 5.
Step 5. Obtain a feasible solution: ψ = D(zk). RP(ϕ, ψ, zˆ)→ (χ∗,Υ∗). pi = F (χ∗,Υ∗);
Output: pi, (χ∗,Υ∗)
then the FGPA continues until the stopping criterion is reached. The pseudocode of the315
proposed hybrid algorithm is shown in algorithm 4.3.316
317
Algorithm 4.3 Hybrid algorithm
Step 1. Initialization: ϕ = ∅, ρ =∞;
Step 2. Find the initial vertices: D(0) → v1. D(qBi ) → v2. ϕ = ϕ ∪ {v1, v2}, M =
Max{D(0), D(qBi )};
Step 3. Solve the master problem: MP(ϕ)→ (χk,Υk). pi = F (χk,Υk);
Step 4. Find a vertex k: D(zk)→ vk. ϕ = ϕ ∪ {vk}, M = Max{M, D(zk)};
Step 5. Evaluate leader’s objective function.
• If ρ > pi then Go to Step 6;
• If ρ ≤ pi then
MMP(ϕ,M)→ (χk∗ ,Υk∗). D(zk∗)→ vk∗ . ϕ = ϕ ∪ {vk∗};
MP(ϕ) → (χk,Υk). pi = F (χk,Υk). D(zk) → vk, ϕ = ϕ ∪ {vk}, M =
Max{M, D(zk)}.
Step 6. Re-evaluating leader’s objective function:
• If ρ > pi then ρ = pi. Return to Step 3;
• If ρ ≤ pi then Stops.
Output: pi, (χk, Υk)
5. Computational experimentation318
In this section, the results obtained from an extensive computational experimentation of319
our solution methodologies are reported. To evaluate both single-level reformulations and320
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the performance of the proposed heuristic algorithms, a set of 360 instances was used. The321
first subset of 180 instances corresponds to a case based on a real situation occurred in the322
Mexican petrochemical industry between 1958-2014. The second subset of 180 instances was323
randomly generated to test the efficiency of our algorithms in more general data sets.324
325
All the computational experiments were conducted in a personal computer Dell Inspiron326
5558, with the following characteristics: a processor Intel(R) Core i3 with 2.10 GHz, 6.00327
GB of RAM under Windows 10 operative system. The mixed-integer linear reformulation328
based on the complementarity slackness condition (hereafter Ref.2), and the three proposed329
heuristic algorithms were implemented in C++ using Microsoft Visual Studio 2017. The330
optimizer used was CPLEX 12.7.1. On the other hand, the non-linear reformulation based331
on the strong duality condition (hereafter Ref.1) was implemented in AMPL using Baron332
18.5.8 as optimizer.333
5.1. Case study334
In Mexico, the government intervention in the petrochemical industry existed by many335
decades. The main characteristic was that the government monopolized the extraction of336
the main raw material for this industry, namely petroleum and some other derivatives called337
basic petrochemicals. Another characteristic of this situation was that state-owned firms338
competed against private firms in the market of final commodities (secondary petrochemi-339
cals).340
341
The institutional framework defined by law the petrochemical industry as the one that342
performs chemical or physical processes to product compounds from petroleum natural hy-343
drocarbons or from the products derived from refinement operations. Some of these products344
may serve as raw materials to the industry, and they were classified as part of the basic petro-345
chemicals. The remaining products were included into the secondary petrochemical category346
[19].347
348
Specifically, in a law from 1958 [20], it was established that only the government was349
allowed to exploit the hydrocarbons related with the oil industry, which was concerned with350
the production, warehousing, distribution, and sales of the petroleum derivatives that can351
be considered as raw materials (basic petrochemicals) for the industry. However, for the352
production of secondary petrochemicals products, state-owned and private firms were al-353
lowed to be involved in. Therefore, Petro´leos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and its subsidiaries was354
in charge of this industry [21], and from 1992, also their descentralized departments [22].355
The classification of basic and secondary petrochemical products varies by law from year to356
year [23], [21], [19], [24], [25], [26], [27].357
358
To delimit the scope and size of our case study instances based on the above situation,359
we consider the number of economic units involved in the manufacturing of organic chemical360
basic products registered by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography in Mexico361
(INEGI by its acronym in Spanish) during the economical census conducted in 1999, 2004,362
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2009, and 2014. The biggest number of these units was registered in 2004, which was363
159. This value is used as an upper bound of the private firms dedicated to secondary364
petrochemical industry. For delimiting the amount of commodities considered, we consider365
the number of commodities classified as basic and secondary petrochemical by the Mexican366
legislation in different years. This information is summarized in table 1.367
Table 1: Classification of petrochemical commodities
Year of the
classification
Basic
petrochemicals
Secondary
petrochemicals
1960 16 -
1986 34 26
1989 8 13
1992 20 35
Obtained by using data from [21], [24], [25], [26]
To complete the instances, we extracted data from the statistical report of the energy368
sector used by the Mexican Secretary of Energy. The data of 47 petrochemical commodi-369
ties from 1980 to 2002 were obtained. The information consists of the demand, prices, and370
productive capacity. For each commodity i, the demand di was generated from a uniform371
distribution with the following parameters: the average of the demands in that period of372
time minus the standard deviation, and the average of the demands in that period of time373
plus the standard deviation. The price pi and the government production capacity q
A
i were374
randomly generated between 1 and the maximum price or the maximum capacity for each375
commodity i, respectively.376
377
The government costs cGi were obtained as the product of the price of each commodity378
i times a random number between 0.22 and 0.60. The latter range was defined based on379
the ratio between the production costs and the PEMEX (the Mexican state-owned firm)380
total income registered from the years 1988-2000, 2011-2013, and 2015-2016. The minimum381
profit that the state-owned firm must achieved was computed as the 30% of the total benefit382
that the government may obtain if all the petrochemicals market demand was satisfied by383
PEMEX.384
385
The state-owned firm has a production capacity qBi regarding raw materials i, which386
was computed as the product of the maximum production coefficient of the private firms387
and the maximum capacity of the state-owned firm for producing commodities. Under this388
assumption, the private firm with best technology could match the production capacity of389
the state-owned firm for an specific commodity.390
391
Production costs cEij of private firm j are defined as the product of random coefficients392
in [0.784, 0.884] multiplied times the price of each commodity i. That range corresponds to393
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the minimum and maximum average values of the ration between the production costs and394
the income per year of five real private firms. These private firms operate in the Mexican395
petrochemical sector: Alpek, Kuo (UEN synthetic rubber), Kuo (UEN polystyrene), Mexi-396
chem, and Pochteca group.397
398
The production technical coefficients aij are randomly generated between [0.085, 2.111],399
which correspond to the range determined by the average plus/minus one standard deviation400
of all the petrochemical substances considered in the report presented by CEPAL [? ]. The401
production levels bij are generated from the interval [1, 95]. The lower bound is natural since402
these coefficients must be strictly positives, while the upper bound is equal to the estimated403
average of the production levels for each substance considered in the petrochemical facilities404
of PEMEX.405
406
Finally, the production capacity mj of the private firms were randomly generated be-407
tween 4, 665 and 20, 825, which came from the average of the production capacity of five408
petrochemical complex of PEMEX.409
410
Based on the above factors and ranges, we generated 30 instances for each one of the411
following sizes:412
• |I| = 10, |J | = 10413
• |I| = 25, |J | = 25414
• |I| = 25, |J | = 75415
• |I| = 50, |J | = 100416
• |I| = 75, |J | = 125417
• |I| = 150, |J | = 200418
As it is mentioned above, the instances generated to analyze the case study were taken419
as a basis for constructing another set of synthetic instances to test the performance of our420
algorithms on a different data set. This new set of instances has the same sizes but were421
randomly generated using arbitrary ranges for each parameter. Furthermore, the generation422
scheme guarantees feasibility of the problem, that is, ensure that the state-owned firm has423
capacity to produce all the demand.424
5.2. Numerical results425
Our computational experiment consists on solving both subsets of instances described426
above, that is, the case-study and the synthetic instances. All of them were solved by the427
two reformulations presented in section 3 and by the three heuristic algorithms proposed428
in section 4. The leader’s objective function value and the required time were registered.429
Among the two exact methods, only Ref.2 was able to optimally solve all the tested instances.430
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Hence, these values were used to compute the optimality gap obtained by the heuristic al-431
gorithms. A maximum CPU time of 1000 seconds was set to the solver for solving Ref.1,432
while Ref.2 and the heuristic algorithms we did not fix a time limit since in all cases the433
required time was rather small.434
435
We observe from our results, that Ref.1 was not able to solve all the instances within the436
time limit. We also observe that the case-study instances are harder to be solved than the437
synthetic ones. For example, for the larger instance sizes (150×200), Ref.1 did not even find438
feasible solutions for the problem. This may be due to the fact that synthetic instances were439
well-balanced so that, in most cases, shortages and surplus are both zero. Summarizing, the440
number of instances solved to optimality by each reformulation is shown in table 2.441
Table 2: Number of instances solved to optimality
Instances Size Ref.1 Ref.2
Case-study
10× 10 15 30
25× 25 0 30
25× 75 0 30
50× 100 0 30
75× 125 0 30
150× 200 0 30
Synthetic
10× 10 30 30
25× 25 29 30
25× 50 30 30
50× 100 29 30
75× 125 28 30
150× 200 13 30
The following tables 3 and 4 report all the results of our experiment. The results are or-442
ganized in five column blocks corresponding to the five solution methods that are compared.443
In each block, we include two columns with the objective function values (F) and the CPU444
time (t). In these tables, averages of the registered values for each size of the case-study and445
synthetic instances are shown. It is worth mentioning that when Ref.1 was not able to solve446
the instance, that instance was omitted for the computation of the corresponding average447
value.448
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Table 3: Summarized results obtained from the case-study instances
Size Ref.1 Ref.2 EPIA FGPA HYBA
F¯ t¯ (s) F¯ t¯ (s) F¯ t¯ (s) F¯ t¯ (s) F¯ t¯ (s)
10× 10 0.561 255.56 0.506 0.18 0.774 0.23 0.825 0.16 0.524 0.41
25× 25 14.225 500.26 1.000 1.86 1.570 0.30 1.171 0.35 1.020 0.71
25× 75 12.435 500.46 0.527 4.36 1.025 0.48 0.565 0.39 0.552 1.02
50× 100 211.696 558.80 1.051 53.15 2.041 2.39 1.132 1.14 1.091 5.18
75× 125 431.138 501.24 1.546 268.89 2.339 8.89 1.811 3.68 1.621 20.69
150× 200 - - 3.279 2754.68 4.129 61.82 5.037 12.06 3.443 112.25
Table 4: Summarized results obtained from the synthetic instances
Size Ref.1 Ref.2 EPIA FGPA HYBA
F¯ t¯ (s) F¯ t¯ (s) F¯ t¯ (s) F¯ t¯ (s) F¯ t¯ (s)
10× 10 0 0.26 0 0.14 0.007 0.08 0.006 0.10 0 0.09
25× 25 0.012 29.01 0 1.43 0 0.11 0.021 0.14 0 0.11
25× 75 0 10.94 0 3.65 0 0.17 0.019 0.20 0 0.17
50× 100 0.057 73.60 0 35.52 0 0.29 0.170 0.31 0 0.28
75× 125 0 118.76 0 90.48 0 0.60 0.086 0.76 0 0.57
150× 200 1.657 414.55 0 193.48 0 1.78 0.443 1.74 0 1.57
We observe from tables 3 and 4 that Ref.1 (recall that Ref.1 is a continuous non-linear449
global optimization problem, while Ref.2 is a MILP) gets values, on average, closed to those450
obtained by Ref.2 for the synthetic instances. However, for the case-study instances the451
situation is different and the average solution values and times move away from the optimal452
averages as the size of the instance increases. Note that for most of the synthetic instances,453
the optimal value is zero, i.e., the supply is perfectly balanced with the demand. Hence,454
neither shortages nor surplus exist due to the generation mechanism of these instances.455
456
Regarding the heuristic algorithms, it can been observed from table 4 that EPIA and457
HYBA report values, on average very close, to the optimal ones for all the sizes of the458
synthetic instances. However, for the case-study instances, HYBA reports the best results459
among all the three heuristic algorithms (see table 3). Moreover, the performance of EPIA460
and FGPA significantly depends on the size of the instance. In terms of the average re-461
quired time, FGPA requires less time for the case-study instances. This finding may be462
derived from the fact that the algorithm explores points not necessarily in the inducible463
region, which may help to approach the optimal solution in a faster manner. On the con-464
trary, HYBA is the algorithm that requires the more time, but this may be obvious since it465
performs all the steps of EPIA and at each iteration it may solve upon four extra mathemat-466
ical programs. Nevertheless, the registered times are acceptable for a problem of this nature.467
468
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To compare the efficiency and the quality of the solutions obtained by the heuristic
algorithms, the optimality gap is computed using the values obtained by Ref.2. Given that
there are many optimal values equal to zero, the optimality gap (GAP) measures the relative
deviation from the optimal value, and it is computed by the following formula:
GAP =
∣∣∣∣(Optimal value)− (Obtained value)(Obtained value)
∣∣∣∣× 100% (105)
Also, an analogous formula is used to compute the relative savings in time (%t). That is,469
the reduction in computational time when solving the problem using the heuristics rather470
than Ref.2. A negative value indicates that the heuristic consumes more time than the exact471
reformulation. The formula used is presented next:472
473
%t =
(Required time by Ref.2)− (Required time by a heuristic)
(Required time by a heuristic)
× 100% (106)
The GAP and %t average values obtained for both type of instances are shown in tables474
5 and 6, respectively.475
Table 5: Evaluating the effectiveness of the heuristic algorithms in the case-study instances
Size EPIA FGPA HYBA
GAP %t GAP %t GAP %t
10× 10 42.27% 12% 29.60% 15% 7.68% -48%
25× 25 40.15% 746% 11.70% 534% 1.67% 190%
25× 75 53.78% 1156% 19.67% 1101% 7.04% 445%
50× 100 54.29% 3418% 10.72% 5418% 6.02% 1176%
75× 125 33.20% 5269% 12.26% 10696% 5.64% 1499%
150× 200 19.29% 9210% 17.20% 30206% 4.92% 3324%
Table 6: Evaluating the effectiveness of the heuristic algorithms in the synthetic instances
Size EPIA FGPA HYBA
GAP %t GAP %t GAP %t
10× 10 6.67% 79% 10.00% 42% 0% 69%
25× 25 0% 1332% 46.67% 1038% 0% 1283%
25× 75 0% 2189% 50.00% 1895% 0% 2192%
50× 100 0% 13714% 90.00% 12176% 0% 14466%
75× 125 0% 16773% 90.00% 14272% 0% 18485%
150× 200 0% 11561% 100.00% 11377% 0% 12781%
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HYBA is the algorithm that shows the best quality in the feasible solutions obtained.476
For the case study instances, the average optimality gap was lower than 8% for all the sizes477
(see table 5); while for the synthetic instances, the average optimality gap was zero (see ta-478
ble 6). FGPA presents a very good average gap in comparison with EPIA in the case-study479
instances, but this behavior is opposite in the synthetic instances. Concerning the savings480
in the required time, the three heuristic algorithms showed significant savings, which is im-481
proved as the size of the instance increases. FGPA is the one that evidence more savings for482
the case-study instances. It is convenient to mention that for the synthetic instances of size483
10 × 10, HYBA showed a negative saving, this implies that Ref.2 was faster to solve these484
instances. But, this is expected since HYBA solves at least one linear model and one MILP485
model, and Ref.2 only solves one MILP model. In spite of that, the advantage of HYBA486
over the reformulation is evident for medium and large-size instances.487
488
To support the latter findings, the number of optimal solutions obtained by each heuris-489
tic algorithm are displayed in table 7. It can be seen from that table that HYBA is the490
algorithm that was able to obtain more optimal solutions. Also, it an be observed that491
FGPA obtained more optimal solutions for the case-study instances than EPIA, but for the492
synthetic instances the behavior was the opposite. These results confirm the suitability for493
combining both heuristic algorithms to create HYBA.494
Table 7: Number of optimal solutions obtained for each heuristic algorithm
Instance Size EPIA FGPA HYBA
Case-study
10× 10 7 11 20
25× 25 0 12 19
25× 75 5 13 19
50× 100 1 13 15
75× 125 0 4 9
150× 200 0 0 1
Synthetic
10× 10 28 27 30
25× 25 30 16 30
25× 75 30 15 30
50× 100 30 3 30
75× 125 30 3 30
150× 200 30 0 30
5.3. Using heuristic solutions to obtain the optimal495
The good performance of the heuristic algorithms lead us to analyze the idea of use the496
near-optimal obtained solutions as an input to Ref.2 seeking to enhance their process. By497
doing this, we expect to significantly reduce the computational time required to optimally498
solve an instance. The results obtained from this experimentation are shown in table 8.499
The columns with label “Ref.2”, “HYBA”, and “Ref.2 w/initial sol.” display the average500
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required time for each solution scheme. The final column “Total” sums the time required501
for the hybrid algorithm and Ref.2 using an initial good solution. As it was expected, the502
advantages of using this scheme are more notorious for medium and large-size instances. The503
best example of this finding is given by the instances of size 150 × 200, in which the time504
was reduced from 2754.68s to 586.53s, and from 193.48s to only 7.28s, for the case-study505
and synthetic instances, respectively.506
Table 8: Average required time when Ref.2 uses an initial heuristic solution
Instance Size Ref.2 HYBA Ref.2 w/initial sol. Total
Case study
10× 10 0.18 0.33 0.07 0.40
25× 25 1.86 0.82 0.39 1.21
25× 75 4.36 1.54 0.80 2.34
50× 100 53.15 6.07 4.24 10.31
75× 125 268.89 20.24 19.73 39.97
150× 200 2754.68 196.38 390.15 586.53
Random
10× 10 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.13
25× 25 1.43 0.12 0.10 0.22
25× 75 3.65 0.19 0.49 0.68
50× 100 35.52 0.33 1.15 1.48
75× 125 90.48 0.46 2.22 2.68
150× 200 193.48 1.95 7.28 9.23
6. Conclusions and research directions507
This paper studies a market regulation situation, in which the government controls the508
distribution of raw material and competes against private firms in the production of final509
commodities. In this market, the government has a privileged position since it determines its510
production and the amount of raw material offered to private firms and its goal is to balance511
the market. Although this type of market situation is common in some economies, to the512
best of our knowledge and after an intensive literature revision, we did not find a similar513
problem in the literature. The situation that motivated our paper comes from the actual514
situation in Mexican petrochemical industry with PEMEX from 1958 till 2014. However,515
this case is not exclusive from the petrochemical industry. Also in the agricultural industry,516
the Mexican government monopolized the production, imports, and distribution of fertil-517
izers from 1970 to 1986 through the state-owned company named FERTIMEX [28]. The518
government also regulated the water supply for agricultural consumption by fixing prices,519
defining production goals, and restricting the land transactions [29]. In addition, this type520
of economic regulation has been applied in other countries. For example, in [3], it is stated521
that there is a tendency to use government instruments in developing countries, mainly522
in raw material industries. An indicator of the latter can be seen in the large amount of523
oil expropriations in the 70’s (see [4], [5], [6]). Also, nationalizations occurred in Bolivia,524
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Russia in 2006 (see [6]).525
526
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Motivated by the lack of models to analyze these type of markets, this paper develops527
a bilevel programming approach that fits naturally to the problem. To solve the bilevel528
problem herein proposed, two single-level reformulations are presented. The first reformula-529
tion uses the lower level necessary and sufficient optimality conditions to ensure the global530
optimum of the bilevel problem. As a result of this reformulation, a continuous non-linear531
problem is obtained. The second reformulation substitutes the above-mentioned conditions532
by the complementarity slackness conditions generating a MILP. These reformulations are533
able to solve optimally limited size instances. Therefore, three heuristic algorithms are pro-534
posed to find good quality feasible solutions in a reasonable computational time. The first535
two algorithms (EPIA and FGPA) are tailored for this problem, and exploits the fact that536
the polyhedron associated to the dual problem of the lower level remains the same for any537
leader’s decision. The third algorithm (HYBA) is a combination of the previous ones.538
539
Extensive computational experimentation is performed to test the exact and heuristic540
approaches proposed in this paper. Two sets of instances are used: case-study instances,541
that arise from the Mexican petrochemical industry, and synthetic instances adapted from542
the previous ones. As a result from the computational experimentation, it can be stated that543
the reformulation that applies the complementarity slackness constraints is more efficient for544
the tested instances. On the other hand, the performance of EPIA and FGPA strongly de-545
pends on the characteristics of the instance. In addition, the hybridization of both heuristic546
algorithms (HYBA) yields to the best results in terms of effectiveness and solutions quality.547
Moreover, HYBA found the optimal solution for all the synthetic instances, and obtained548
optimality gaps less than 8% in the case-study ones. It is worth to mention that HYBA549
found the optimal value in at least 50% for the first four types of instance sizes.550
551
Finally, it can be concluded from our computational experiment, that the most efficient552
manner to find optimal solutions for the bilevel problem is by obtaining a good quality553
feasible solution through HYBA and then using it as an initial solution to solve Ref.2. By554
doing this, a significant computational time reduction is achieved.555
556
Note that this bilevel problem may have multiple optimal solutions, each of them offers557
different alternatives to the upper level decision-maker (government) for producing and558
offering raw material to the lower level decision-makers (private firms). Therefore, this559
characteristic is economically worthy to be explored. Another possible research direction560
is to neglect, in the model, the assumption there exists an organism that manages the561
cooperation among private firms. Hence, a new element will emerge in the model since562
competition among private firms will also exist. As a result of this, a bilevel problem with563
one leader and multiple followers will appear. Then, in a natural way, a Stackelberg game564
in which the follower’s problem consists of a generalized Nash game fits to analyze this565
situation.566
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